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National Party Politics and Supranational Politics in the European Union:  
New Evidence from the European Parliament 
 
Abstract 
Political parties play an important role in structuring political competition at different levels of 
governance in the European Union (EU).  The political parties that contest national elections also 
participate in the EU legislative institutions, with the governing parties at the national level 
participating in the Council of Ministers and a broad range of national parties represented in the 
European Parliament (EP).  Recent research indicates that national parties in the EP have formed 
ideological coalitions—party groups—that represent transnational political interests.  These party 
groups appear to manage legislative behavior such that national interests—which dominate the 
Council of Ministers—are subjugated to ideological conflict.  In this paper, we demonstrate that 
the roll-call vote evidence for the impact of party groups in the EP is misleading. Because party 
groups have incentives to select votes for roll call so as to hide or feature particular voting 
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Political conflict in the European Union (EU) is primarily resolved through legislative 
institutions.  An important longstanding question about European integration has been whether 
the EU simply manages international relations—where nations compete for policy—or whether 
ideological political interests, articulated by political parties, provide a voice for transnational 
political interests.  Clearly, national political parties play a significant role in the EU legislative 
process.  The Council of Ministers consists of national representatives of the governing party(ies) 
in each member-state.  The European Parliament (EP) is composed of legislators chosen in 
national elections contested by national political parties.  Thus, we might consider EU 
governance simply an aggregation of national partisan politics, with the governing parties 
participating in both the EP and the Council.  Recent research indicates, however, that 
transnational party groups in the EP appear to dominate nationality in shaping legislative 
behavior.  Party groups consist of ideologically related parties (e.g., socialist parties) from 
different countries.  Thus, they can represent transnational interests in legislative deliberations.  
To the extent this is true, national interests as articulated by national parties must contend with 
transnational political concerns in EU legislative politics.  This would clearly be a serious 
divergence from a typical international organization or standard international bargaining between 
states.   In this paper, we review the literature on party groups and voting behavior in the EP.  
We show that the common conclusion that party groups are a strong influence on legislative 
behavior is based on faulty evidence.  The simple reason is that roll-call votes, which are the 
basis of most empirical analyses of legislative behavior in the EP, are not a random sample of 
votes.  Indeed, party group leaders call the vast majority of roll calls and have clear incentives to 
misrepresent the actual conflict in the EP.   
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This paper also speaks to the broader literature on roll-call vote analysis.  The study of 
legislative behavior in democracies relies fundamentally on the analysis of recorded, or roll call, 
votes.
1  Most prominently, scholars of the United States Congress have used roll call votes 
(RCVs) to explore how parties organize and influence legislative behavior, test theories of 
internal legislative organization, and characterize the dimensionality of the U.S. legislative 
policy space.
2  These tools of RCV analysis are increasingly applied in other legislative settings, 
be they other national assemblies or subnational legislatures.
3
However, the value of traditional RCV analysis outside the U.S. Congress is dubious.  
The contemporary US Congress differs from many other legislatures in that almost all legislative 
votes are by roll-call.  For example, the French National Assembly, German Bundestag, Dutch 
Parliament, the Swiss National Council, Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, Argentine Chamber of 
Deputies, and various U.S. state legislatures decide only a fraction of legislation by RCVs.
4  In 
these contexts, the quality of our inferences about voting behavior depends crucially on the 
sampling properties of RCVs.  If roll calls are not a random sample of legislative votes, we 
would need to account explicitly for the selection process before drawing accurate inferences 
about legislative behavior.  
Why might the selection of votes for roll call be non-random?  For one, it is widely 
argued that political party leaders, who normally control the selection of RCVs, choose roll calls 
based on their expectations regarding the level of party cohesiveness and the character of 
political conflict that vote will present.
5  If this is true, then the selection of RCVs would be 
endogenous to two of the most commonly studied aspects of legislative behavior: party cohesion 
and the dimensionality of legislative competition.  This potential sampling problem has long 
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been recognized.
6 However, subsequent studies have generally ignored the issue and no study 
has yet examined or addressed it.
7
The purpose of this study is to answer three questions: 1) is there evidence that RCVs are 
requested strategically?; 2) if so, what is the substantive effect?; and 3) is this effect 
consequential for our conclusions about legislative voting behavior? To answer these questions, 
we focus on a single legislative chamber: the European Parliament (EP).  We examine the EP for 
three reasons.  Less than a third of all votes are by roll call.  There is reason to believe that the 
legislative parties – called “party groups” – are using RCVs in a fashion that would introduce 
selection bias into the RCV sample. And, a large and growing literature uses RCVs to study 
legislative behavior in the EP. Thus, the EP is a chamber in which RCVs may be a biased sample 
of votes, and we will be able to evaluate the substantive significance of this bias by re-examining 
a well-developed body of literature.  Furthermore, the EP is very similar to many other 
parliaments in terms of the methods of voting and the prevalence of RCVs.
8  Thus, lessons 
learned from the EP should provide insight into problems common to other legislatures.  
 
1.  Voting Behavior, Party Group Cohesion, and Party Group Competition 
  A long research tradition in comparative legislative behavior has focused on evaluating 
the importance of parties to legislative behavior.  Specifically, scholars used summary statistics 
of the similarity of voting patterns among members of parties to evaluate party cohesion and the 
dissimilarity of voting patterns across legislative parties to define the character of inter-party 
policy conflict.
9  EU scholars have applied this analytic approach to the study of transnational 
coalitions of national party delegations in the EP, known as party groups (PGs). 
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In many regards, these PGs resemble national legislative parties. They are generally 
organized according to traditional party families – e.g. national Socialist party delegations 
comprise the Party of European Socialists.  They are considered important to the internal 
organization of the legislative chamber – e.g. speaking time, committee assignments, and other 
valuable roles and resources in the EP are distributed via PGs.  And, they often instruct their 
membership on how to vote on particular issues.  Consequently, many scholars have been 
interested in evaluating the importance of PG to the legislative behavior of their members.. 
These studies of voting behavior by members of the EP (MEPs) have generally 
converged on two conclusions. First, PG cohesion is higher than cohesion by nationality, is 
objectively high for the major PGs, and has generally increased over time.
10  Studies based on 
more recent and comprehensive data confirm these findings.
11
Second, legislative politics in the EP is competitive along one main ideological 
dimension that reflects the traditional left-right political conflict found at the domestic level.  
This conclusion is based on several analyses of vote patterns among MEPs across a variety of 
issue areas.
12 More recent studies using NOMINATE to estimate the political space generally 
support the same finding.
13   
 
2.1  Reconsidering RCVs 
If RCVs are a random sample of the universe of legislative votes cast in the EP, these 
studies and their conclusions are unproblematic. However, there is good reason to believe that 
RCVs are not a random sample, because there is good reason to believe that RCVs are not 
randomly requested. 
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A vote in the EP is designated for roll call if any party group or a group of thirty-two 
members of the EP request it prior to the day of the vote.
14  In practice, PGs request the vast 
majority of roll calls.  Scholars have identified two primary motivations for why PG leaders 
request RCVs: disciplining and signaling.  The disciplining argument claims that PGs may use 
RCVs to influence legislative outcomes.  PG leaders have the ability to reward or punish their 
membership through a variety of means.
15  However, PG leaders cannot exercise party discipline 
without some way of monitoring their membership. Thus, PG leaders have an incentive to 
request RCVs when they want to enforce party discipline.  The signaling argument posits that 
PGs use RCVs to signal their or other groups’ policy positions to a third party, such as a national 
electorate or another EU institution.
16 In particular, a PG may want to publicize its policy 
agenda, to embarrass a rival PG by revealing its low cohesion on a particular policy, or to 
distinguish themselves publicly from other PGs on particular policies they deem significant. 
If these arguments are right, RCV data should be biased in ways that directly relate to the 
literature’s two core issues: party group cohesion and the dimensionality of policy conflict. The 
decision to request is endogenous to the expected level of cohesion if PG leaders request RCVs 
to induce party discipline.  And, if PG leaders request RCVs in order to signal their positions on 
specific issues, the decision to request is endogenous to the policy area of the vote.  As a result, 
the revealed dimensionality of conflict might tell us more about the areas of conflict parties want 
to highlight than the true dimensions of conflict in the legislature.  
 
2.2 Research Design 
To address this issue, we evaluate the sampling properties of RCVs with respect to three 
vote characteristics: 1) the identity of the RCV requesting party group, 2) the issue area of the 
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vote, and 3) the legislative importance of the vote.  The first characteristic provides a direct test 
of strategic behavior. The more we observe certain party groups tending to make RCV requests, 
the stronger the evidence that PGs are making conscious choices over the decision to call RCVs. 
The second two characteristics allow us to test whether strategic PG behavior is biasing 
the data in two substantively important ways. Examining votes by their issue area provides direct 
evidence over whether there is bias in how RCVs characterize the dimensions of policy conflict. 
The more RCVs tend to over-represent certain issue areas, the more likely RCVs are incorrectly 
characterizing that dimensionality. Examining votes by their legislative importance provides 
direct evidence over whether RCV samples accurately represent legislatively consequential 
behavior. Since most literature is interested in the legislative consequences of voting behavior, 




To evaluate these three characteristics of RCVs, we collected and analyzed a novel 
dataset including all votes in the EP plenary sessions from July 1999 to June 2000—the first year 
of the fifth directly elected EP.
18  This year allows comparison with previous RCV analyses.
19
  Here we focus on four attributes of these votes: 1) the method of vote; 2) the requesting 
group for each RCV; 3) the responsible committee for each legislative motion; and 4) the type 
of motion.  The method of vote indicates whether the vote was by roll call or not.
20  The 
requesting group indicates which EP party group(s), if any, requested the RCV.  The 
responsible committee indicates the name of the committee responsible for reporting the motion 
to the floor.  And, the type of motion indicates whether the vote was on a Resolution or a 
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legislative proposal, which we distinguish according to legislative procedure: Assent, 
Consultation, or Codecision (round I, II, or III).   
Each of these attributes represents one of the three vote characteristics discussed above. 
First, requesting group obviously allows us to evaluate which groups tend to request RCVs. 
Second, each responsible committee in the EP has jurisdiction over specific sets of policy areas.  
Thus, examining which responsible committees’ legislative texts are voted on by roll call 
provides one reasonable standard by which to evaluate whether some issue areas tend to be over 
or under-represented in RCVs.  
Finally, the type of motion allows us to evaluate whether the vote is legislatively 
consequential. The EP makes decisions using several different legislative procedures, some of 
which allow for multiple rounds of votes.  Resolutions and Consultation votes are primarily 
symbolic.  Resolutions are EP motions not directly associated with any piece of legislation, while 
Consultation votes are non-binding opinions on legislative proposals.  In contrast, votes under 
the Assent and Co-decision procedures can have a direct and substantial impact on legislative 
outcomes.  Under the Assent procedure, the EP can veto the motion under consideration.  Under 
the Codecision procedure, the effect of an EP vote depends on the round.  Codecision I is similar 
to the Consultation procedure in that the EP issues an opinion.  However, if the EP and Council 
of Ministers do not reach an agreement, a second round of deliberation occurs.  At that point, the 
EP can amend or reject the Council’s common position.  If agreement is still not reached, then 
Codecision III begins with the bill being referred to a Conciliation Committee.  If the EP rejects 
the resulting proposal, the text fails.  Thus, Assent and Codecision III votes are clearly 
consequential.  Codecision I and II votes may be consequential. 
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2.3 Methodology 
  The critical inferential question is whether RCVs represent an unbiased sample of EP 
votes.  We address this issue mainly through standard statistical tests of significance for 
differences between the sample of votes—the roll call votes—and the population of votes. The 
null hypothesis throughout the ensuing analysis is that any deviation in the distribution of RCVs 
across the relevant categories (e.g., the type of motion) from that of the population of votes is 
due to chance.  In other words, the null hypothesis is the assumption, sometimes implicit, 
justifying past RCV analyses.   
Note that most of our analysis does not distinguish between votes on amendments and 
final votes. This is the norm in the literature on RCV analysis in the EP.
21 But the main 
conclusions from our analysis hold if one focuses exclusively on final votes. 
 
3.1.a Analysis: Requesting Group 
Table 1 presents the first set of results.
22  Clearly, RCVs are not being requested by any 
reasonable standard of proportionality, which is a prominent justification for RCV analysis in the 
EP.
23  RCVs are not randomly distributed across party groups, whether we consider party groups 
of equal status or we weight them by the size of their membership.
24 This is true whether we 
consider just final votes, amendments, or both.
25 Further, it is apparent that different party groups 
use RCVs for different purposes. The PPE tend to request RCVs on final votes and they are the 
source of the bulk of the RCVs on final votes. In comparison, the Verts/ALE, the TDI, and the 
ELDR primarily request RCVs on amendments, and those votes are the majority of the RCVs on 
amendments. Thus, these findings provide initial evidence that party groups appear to request 
RCVs strategically.  
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[Table 1 here] 
 
3.1.b Analysis: Responsible Committee 
Table 2 presents the distribution of RCVs by responsible committee.
26  The table reports 
the number and proportion of votes on legislative texts referred out of each of these committees 
for RCVs and for all votes. As the Chi-squared statistic indicates, the null hypothesis that the 
sample is representative is easily rejected.  More specifically, we see that a majority of RCVs 
originate in just a few committees. The committees for Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Home 
Affairs, Constitutional Affairs, and Economic and Monetary Affairs have a high proportion of 
their votes by roll call (approximately 33%, 97%, and 67%, respectively). Consequently, their 
votes account for only 28.35% of all votes, but 63.88% of all RCVs.  That is, their percent of 
RCVs is more than 100% higher than their percent of all votes.  Furthermore, we observe very 
few RCVs on legislation from some committees. For example, there were fifty votes on texts 
from the committee on Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunities, but none by roll call.  
 
3.1.c Analysis: Type of Motion 
Finally, consider the sampling properties of RCVs by type of motion. Table 3 presents 
the distribution between resolutions and legislative votes and table 4 presents the distribution 
among legislative votes. As table 3 demonstrates, Resolutions make up a much larger proportion 
of RCVs than they do of all votes. Table 4 shows that Consultation votes and Codecision I votes 
comprise a larger percentage of RCVs than they do of all votes, while Codecision II, III and 
Assent votes comprise a much smaller percentage of RCVs than they do of all votes. 
[Tables 3 and 4 here] 
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  Once again, this evidence is consistent with the argument that strategic behavior is 
biasing RCV samples. However, more importantly, this evidence also demonstrates that the bias 
massively under-samples the most legislatively consequential votes – Codecision II, III, and 
Assent.  Out of a total of 646 Codecision II, III and Assent votes, only five (or 0.77%) were by 
roll call.   Thus, the PGs are systematically hiding exactly the voting behavior we are interested 
in studying. 
  In sum, this evidence demonstrates that the RCV sample is biased, that this bias is quite 
severe, and that it is associated with three substantively important characteristics. Thus, this 
evidence suggests that we should proceed with great caution in interpreting roll-call evidence. 
Next we consider the substantive impact of this bias on the two main findings in the EP voting 
behavior literature. 
 
3.2.a. Implications for Measuring Intra-Party Cohesion  
  Recall that the extant literature on EP legislative behavior concludes that intra-party 
cohesion is objectively high, is high relative to national cohesion, and has steadily increased over 
time. These findings rely upon two critical assumptions: that RCV estimates of PG cohesion are 
unbiased and that these estimates are sufficiently precise to make meaningful comparisons over 
time and across PGs.  In fact, neither of these assumptions is valid for the RCV sample.   
Consider precision first.  Because RCVs are a sample, traditional measures of party 
cohesion (e.g., average vote agreement scores) must be treated as sample statistics, which is why 
we normally report standard errors around such estimates.  But when the sample is non-random, 
statistical theory does not provide guidance in calculating sampling error.  Indeed, the sampling 
error associated with nonrandom samples is potentially much higher than that for random 
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samples.  This is a fundamental problem for studying party cohesion in the EP, since we cannot 
appraise the precision of our estimates of cohesion based on RCVs.     
To make matters worse, the evidence suggests that RCVs samples are biased towards 
significantly over-estimating inter-party group cohesion. First, recall that most previous studies 
pooled RCVs on legislation and on resolutions to calculate PG cohesion or agreement scores.  
Second, note that the composition of PGs on Resolution votes is systematically different from 
the composition of PGs on legislative votes.  MEP attendance increases with the legislative 
import of the motion, meaning we see low attendance on Resolutions.
27  Third, we have good 
reasons to believe those MEPs who are most likely to be absent on Resolution votes are the least 
likely to vote with the PG majority on legislation.  Those MEPs holding or seeking PG 
leadership positions should be more inclined to attend and more likely to vote with the PG 
majority.  If so, then the subset of PG members attending votes should become smaller and more 
cohesive as the importance of the vote declines.  And, since we are interested in inferring the 
level of PG cohesion on important legislative votes, the pooling of legislative votes with a large 
number of Resolution votes would generate an over-estimation of the level of PG cohesion on 
legislative votes.  
  If the above story is accurate, we would expect that the MEP absenteeism would be 
positively related to the frequency of defection from PG majority positions.  And, more 
specifically, the more often the MEP is absent on Resolution votes, the more likely the MEP is to 
defect from the PG majority position on legislative votes.  Evidence from the two largest party 
groups in the chamber, the PES and the EPP, support this claim.  For the RCVs in our dataset, 
we estimated the correlation between the percent of votes the MEP voted against the PG majority 
(i.e., the rate of defection) on all RCVs and the number of absences on all RCVs.
28  The 
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correlations were .35 for the PES and .51 for the EPP, with both significant at the .01 level.  We 
also estimated the correlation between absences on Resolution votes and frequency of defection 
from the PG majority on legislative votes only.  The correlation was 0.17 for the PES and 0.46 
for the EPP, with both coefficients significant at the .02 level.  Thus, the MEPs from the PES and 
EPP who most frequently toe the PG line are the least likely to be absent on Resolution votes.   
We suspect this leads to substantial bias.  Recall that 86% of RCVs in our dataset were on 
Resolutions.  And the fraction of MEPs absent on Resolutions is far from trivial, amounting to 
almost a third of the chamber on average.  Had these Resolution votes truly been legislative 
votes, we would have expected higher attendance and therefore lower PG cohesion than 
observed on these resolutions.  Thus, the compositional differences in PGs across types of 
motions due to absences serve to inflate cohesion scores. 
 
3.2.b. Characterizing Policy Conflict 
RCV studies have found that policy conflict in the EP is characterized by four 
dimensions, but with the left-right ideological dimension accounting for the lion’s share of the 
votes.
29 Our findings indicate this conclusion is dubious; RCV studies are most likely incorrectly 
characterizing the policy space and missing at least one relevant dimension of policy conflict. 
First, recall that RCVs are not a representative sample by issue area. This sample will 
miss or de-emphasize a dimension of conflict if those under-sampled issue areas include policies 
that engender legislative conflict orthogonal to the dimensions revealed by RCVs.  We can show 
that the selection bias in RCV requests likely has exactly this consequence.  A recent study 
assessed the congruence between the dimensionality of MEP attitudes regarding different 
policies, as reported in surveys, and MEP voting behavior, as indicated by RCVs.
30  The findings 
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indicate that MEP policy attitudes are structured by three orthogonal issue domains: integration-
independence, socio-economic left-right, and libertarian-traditional.  Their RCV analysis, 
however, found a dominant left-right dimension, three other dimensions that provide 
comparatively little explanatory power,
31 and no libertarian-traditional dimension. 
Our analysis provides an explanation for these inconsistent findings. To see why, recall 
that only the survey data uncovered a libertarian-traditional dimension.  One of the key issues 
that defined this dimension was women’s rights—specifically, a woman’s freedom to decide on 
abortion.  Now, looking at table 2, we see that none of the 50 votes on legislation associated with 
the Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunity Committee were by roll call.  Consequently, the 
RCV sample is very likely biased away from finding this type of libertarian-traditional 
dimension.  But, given that the survey of MEPs revealed such a dimension, we might well expect 
that, had these 50 votes been recorded, an analysis of RCVs would reveal that dimension.  The 
selection bias in RCV requests simply hides it from view.  
Second, the attendance finding discussed in the previous section also suggests that policy 
dimensions are being under-weighted or even omitted entirely. Techniques, such as 
NOMINATE, identify dimensions of policy conflict based upon the observed voting cleavages in 
the data. The greater the number of different voting cleavages in the data, the greater the number 
of policy dimensions. Thus, since the inclusion of Resolution votes likely under-estimates intra-
party group conflict, RCVs likely under-estimate or even miss policy dimensions that are 
orthogonal to the observed dimension of inter-party group conflict. 
 
4.  Conclusions and Future Research 
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In sum, this study provides evidence of strategic behavior in the decision to request roll 
call votes, demonstrates that this behavior biases the data in substantively important ways and to 
a very substantial degree, and casts serious doubt on existing findings in the EP voting behavior 
literature. Importantly, however, the implications of these findings apply to the many legislatures 
around the world where RCVs are only a fraction of legislative votes, which includes a large 
number of legislatures in Europe.
32  It is also true of many legislatures outside Europe: e.g., the 
Chilean Senate, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, and the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.
33
Notably, we do not conclude from our study that RCVs are a fatally flawed source of 
information about legislative behavior.  Rather, this study highlights the need to understand the 
process that generates RCVs before trying to analyze them. Doing so requires serious theoretical 
work.  While existing substantive work on the EP and other legislatures has already identified 
two broad motivations for parties to request RCVs, party discipline and signaling, we lack theory 
to precisely explain the conditions under which these motivations would lead to RCVs.
34 Only 
with discriminating predictions over how observable characteristics of a bill should relate to the 
decision to request a RCV, if that motivation truly is driving the decision to request a RCV, can 
we identify the causes of RCVs.  For example, a model based on a party discipline motivation 
would likely have clear implications about how the choice of votes for roll call depend on 
whether the party leadership considers discipline as crucial to deciding the legislative outcome 
and whether the party members would vote cohesively or not in the absence of discipline.  With 
those predictions in hand, as well as measures of MEP preferences, we would be able to specify 
a test of that model.  Assuming an equivalent elaboration of the signaling argument provides an 
alternative, discriminating set of predictions, we will then be able to test among these alterative 
explanations. 
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This test, once performed, will provide a much fuller understanding of the data 
generation process. With that knowledge, we could start to consider ways of accounting for the 
bias in inferring legislative behavior from RCVs. One option is to use a Heckman-like selection 
bias model. This approach has both pros and cons.  While the standard Heckman model has the 
advantage of being relatively well-known, it is most easily applied to cases with a common unit 
of analysis in both parts of the two-step model (e.g., a vote).  This is important since all the 
variables in the main model need to be in the selection model.
35   In the EP context, this is a 
problem.  The selection step would involve predicting whether a vote is by roll-call or not, but 
many extant models of party group influence on voting behavior use a some aggregation of votes 
for a party group (e.g., the average vote agreement over a 6-month period).
36  Also, we are 
unaware of an obvious Heckman solution for scaling procedures like NOMINATE.  Thus, a 
Heckman-like solution would require some econometric innovation beyond the standard model. 
Other options exist as well. For example, for illustrative purposes, suppose that the party 
discipline theory predicts the use of RCVs extraordinarily well. We could then use the specified 
party discipline theory to generate the unobserved counterfactual; what would have happened if a 
roll call vote had been requested on a particular vote? Having uncovered the “full” record of how 
every legislator did or would have voted on every vote, analysis of voting behavior could 
proceed. While it is impossible to say what approach will prove most productive, we believe 
three things are clear; we must start to think hard about accounting for selection bias in RCV 
data, there are a number of plausible avenues to pursue in order to redress this problem, and in 
fact the problem provides some interesting and fertile ground for new research. 
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Table 1.  RCV Requesting Groups on Final Votes and Amendments 
 







































4 48  52 
  -  7.69 92.31  100 
  2.56 2.33  6.81  5.88 
European Liberal Democratic 






17 83  100 
  -  17.00 83.00  100 






10  55 65 
  -  15.38 84.62  100 
  7.99 5.59  7.80  7.35 





29  69 98 
  -  29.59 70.41  100 
  27.95 16.20  9.79  11.09 





6  91  97 
  -  6.19 93.81  100 
  5.11 3.35 12.91  10.97 







4  69  73 
  -  5.48 94.52  100 






21  190  211 
  -  9.95 90.05  100 
  7.19 11.73 26.95  23.87 





85  70  155 
  -  54.84 45.61  100 





2  0  2 
  -  100 0  100 





2  17  19 
  -  10.53 21.52  100 





0  13  13 
  - 0  100  100 
  -  0 1.84 1.47 
Raw Total 









Chi-Squared Statistic   110  9907  10030 
a Party group percent of chamber. 
b The percent of that party group’s RCVs that were in that category of 
votes. 
c The percent of RCVs in that category requested by that party group. 
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Agriculture and Rural Development   147 65  212 
  69.34 30.66  - 
  6.11 5.99  5.26 
Budgetary Control   53 42  95 
  55.79 44.21  - 
  1.80 3.87  2.36 
Budgets   361 74  435 
  82.99 17.01  - 
  12.25 6.82  10.79 
Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs   359 174  533 
  67.35 32.65  - 
  12.18 16.04  13.22 
Parliament's delegation to the Conciliation Committee  10 1  11 
  90.91 9.09  - 
  .34 0.09 0.27 
Conference of Presidents  8 0  8 
  100 0  - 
  .27 0.00 0.20 
Constitutional Affairs   13 358 371 
  3.5 96.50  - 
  .44 33.00 9.20 
Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport   87 0  87 
  100 0  - 
  2.95 0.00  2.16 
Development and Cooperation   61 1  62 
  98.39 1.61  - 
  2.07 0.09  1.54 
Economic and Monetary Affairs   78 161 239 
  32.64 67.36  - 
  2.65 14.84  5.93 
Employment and Social Affairs   88 16 104 
  84.62 15.38  - 
  2.99 1.47  2.58 
Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy  761 6  767 
  99.22 .78  - 
  25.81 0.55  19.02 
Fisheries   118 30  148 
  79.73 20.27  - 
  4.00 2.76  3.67 
Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy  161 30  191 
  84.29 15.71  - 
  5.46 2.76  4.74 
Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy  295 63  358 
  82.4 17.60  - 
  10.01 5.81  8.87 
Legal Affairs and the Internal Market   148 38  186 
  79.57 20.43  - 
  5.02 3.50  4.61 
Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism  150 26  176 
  85.23 14.77  - 
  5.09 2.40  4.36 
Women's Rights and Equal Opportunities   50 0  50 
  100 0  - 
  1.70 0.00  1.24 
Total  2948 1085  4033 
Chi-Squared Statistic  1147.5 (p < .001) 
a Percent in that category from that committee. 
b Percent from that committee (not) roll-called. 
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Table 3.  Percent and Number of votes and RCVs by type of Motion 
 


















      








      








      
Total 3371  1297  4668 
Chi-Square Statistic 
 
756.3 (p < .001) 
a Percent in that category that are of that type of proposal. 
b Percent of that type of proposal (not) roll-called. 
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Table 4.  Percent and Number of Votes and RCVs by Type of Legislative Vote 
 


















        
Consultation  985  103  1088 
   90.53  9.47  - 
   44.13  59.54  45.24 
        
Assent   15  1  16 
   93.75  6.25  - 
   .67  0.58  0.67 
        
Codecision I    606  65  671 
   90.31  9.69  - 
   27.15  37.57  27.90 
        
Codecision II    616  3  619 
   99.52  .48  - 
   27.60  1.73  25.74 
        
Codecision III    10  1  11 
   90.91  9.09  - 
   .45  0.58  0.46 
        
Codecision II, III, and Assent    641  5  646 
   99.23  .77  - 
   42.16  3.9  26.9 
        
Total    2232 173  2405 
Chi-Square Statistic   
 
88.57 (p < .001) 
a Percent in that category that are of that type of proposal. 
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